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Melissa H. Weresht
Introduction
This brief Article1 relates to the institutional discrimination
against women within the legal academy. More specifically, this
Article addresses the potential for exploitation of law faculty
members who hold American Bar Association (ABA) Accreditation
Standard 405(c) status and the likelihood that such exploitation
will have a disparate, discriminatory impact on a predominantly
female cohort of law faculty.
ABA Standard 405(c) applies specifically to clinical law
faculties2 and provides the standard for the status held by many
legal writing faculties.3 It reads:
A law school shall afford to full-time clinical faculty members
a form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure, and
non-compensatory perquisites reasonably similar to those
provided other full-time faculty members. A law school may
require these faculty members to meet standards and
obligations reasonably similar to those required of other full-
time faculty members. However, this Standard does not
preclude a limited number of fixed, short-term appointments
in a clinical program predominantly staffed by full-time
faculty members, or in an experimental program of limited
duration.4
t. Professor of Law, Drake University Law School. The Author would like to
thank several colleagues for their thoughtful comments on prior drafts of this
Article, including Danielle Shelton, Lisa Reel Schmidt, Linda Berger, Ruth Anne
Robbins, and Kristen K. Tiscione.
1. The title of this Article is inspired by the Dr. Seuss story, The Sneetches.
DR. SEUSS, The Sneetches, in THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 1, 11 (1961).
2. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
Standard 405(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
3. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE
ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 63 (2013), http://www.lwionline.org/uploads/
FileUpload/2013SurveyReportfinal.pdf (question 65).
4. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
Standard 405(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
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The security of position afforded to 405(c) contractual law faculty
members, defined as "reasonably similar to tenure, 5 is somewhat
vague and largely untested. This ambiguity provides an
opportunity for law schools undergoing financial strain to
terminate contractual legal writing faculty members without
providing adequate, tenure-like protections. Augmenting this
problem is the fact that faculty members who hold 405(c) status
represent an overwhelmingly female cohort of faculty,6 resulting in
a discriminatory and disparate impact on female members of the
academy.
This Article first provides statistics to demonstrate that
faculty members who hold tenure-track and tenured positions are
more likely to be male, whereas faculty members who hold
contractual positions with substandard security of position are
more likely to be female.7 This Article then explores the type of
security of position rights and processes that should apply to
405(c) contractual faculty members by examining the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) guidelines commonly
referenced for tenured positions.8 Next, this Article considers
whether the distinction between the security of position afforded
to tenure-track and tenured faculty members, who are
predominantly male, and the security of position afforded to
contractual faculty members, who are predominantly female, can
be reasonably defended on the basis of merit, ultimately
5. Id.
6. See ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., supra note 3, at
68 (question 71(b)) (showing that 73% of legal writing faculty members are women).
Many of the resources cited in this Article pertain to legal writing faculty members,
as the impact of the Standards on this constituency has been widely examined.
However, the importance of protecting the rights of 405(c) faculty members is not
limited to legal writing professors, since a significant number of clinical faculty
members are women. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An
Empirical Study of Occupational Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73
UMKC L. REV. 293, 334 tbl.1A (2004). In addition, female clinicians are more
likely to have 405(c) status than their male counterparts. See Marina Angel, The
Glass Ceiling for Women in Legal Education: Contract Positions and the Death of
Tenure, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 4 (2000). According to one study, approximately 41%
of tenured and tenure-track clinician positions were held by female faculty
members, and 59% were held by male faculty members. Id. In contrast,
approximately 57% of 405(c) clinician positions were held by women, whereas 43%
were held by men. Id. Finally, for clinician positions that were not tenured,
tenure-track or 405(c), women held approximately 61% of these positions, whereas
men held 39%. Id. These statistics demonstrate the importance of protecting
faculty with 405(c) status, since faculty who hold these positions are predominantly
female.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
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concluding that, in most cases, it cannot.9 Finally, this Article
identifies some of the discriminatory consequences the ABA
Standards can have on female students and professors-
consequences that will be compounded if law schools fail to provide
adequate, tenure-like protections to contractual faculty members.0
This Article concludes with a challenge to the academy to closely
monitor discrimination against female law faculty members due to
law schools' failure to afford contractual law professors with
security of position that is actually reasonably similar to tenure.11
I. The Sorting Process: Men and Women in the Legal
Academy
According to the Association of American Law Schools'
(AALS) Statistical Report on Law Faculty, during the 2008-2009
school year, 62.2% of law school faculty members were male,
whereas 37.3% were female. 12 In terms of job security, men held
approximately 70% of tenure or tenure-track appointments. 
13
Conversely, as of 2013, approximately 73% of legal writing faculty
members were women.14 While some legal writing faculty
members are tenured or on tenure track, the majority hold
positions with ABA 405(c) or 405(d) status.15
These statistics demonstrate that legal writing faculty
members-who are typically women-are relegated to less secure
positions.16 Moreover, in the recent economic climate, security of
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. PATI ABDULLINA, ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW
FACULTY 2008-2009, at 10 (2009).
13. Id. at 24.
14. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., supra note 3, at 68
(question 71(b)). As to why that is the case, Kathryn Stanchi and Jan Levine
observed: "The appearance of a cadre of low-pay, low-status positions in skills
courses flowed from two major events in the history of American law schools: the
sharp rise in general law school enrollment in the 1970s and early 1980s and the
influx of women into law schools in the mid-1970s." Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M.
Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools'Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 7 (2001).
15. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., supra note 3, at 63
(question 65).
16. The situation is even more painful and precarious for women of color who
teach legal writing. Lorraine K. Bannai acknowledged that "[a]t the same time
that their experiences are shaped by their gender and race, women of color who
teach Legal Writing within the legal academy [are] also subject to an academic
hierarchy that diminishes them because of what they teach." Lorraine K. Bannai,
Challenged X 3: The Stories of Women of Color Who Teach Legal Writing, 29
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 275, 278 (2014). In addition, "the ways in which
2016]
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position for legal writing faculty members may be more tenuous
than the language of the Standards suggests it should be.17 ABA
Standard 405(d), applicable to legal writing faculties, merely
affords the security necessary to "attract and retain a faculty" and
to "safeguard academic freedom." '18 ABA Standard 405(c), which
applies specifically to clinical law faculty members, as well as to
many legal writing faculty members, 9 requires that covered
professors be afforded "a form of security of position reasonably
similar to tenure."2 An Interpretation to this Standard clarifies
that "[a] form of security of position reasonably similar to tenure
includes a separate tenure track or a program of renewable long-
term contracts" and that the phrase 'long-term contract' means at
least a five-year contract that is presumptively renewable.""
II. Security of Position: Rights and Processes
Ostensibly, tenure-like 405(c) job security should require a
law school that chooses to terminate professors to provide 405(c)
faculty members with a type of process similar to that afforded to
tenured faculty members. The termination of a tenured faculty
member not involving cause would typically require a relatively
rigorous showing of financial strain. For example, the AAUP
race affects their experiences may become invisible in the dialogue about status
and gender issues concerning Legal Writing faculty." Id. at 279. Bannai showed
that the triple bias against women of color in legal writing presents a complex and
complicated problem, and she noted that "conflating treatment based on gender
and status with treatment based on race fails to recognize the profound ways in
which marginalization based on race is different from that based on gender and
status." Id. As Teri McMurtry-Chubb explained:
In general, minority women in tenure-track positions enter the academy at
lower ranks than their male counterparts and are often given low-status
teaching assignments, specifically in legal writing. If women of color face
this type of discrimination in tenure-track positions, positions that offer
the opportunity of job security and academic freedom, then what possible
long-term professional benefit could they derive from employment solely in
[Legal Research and Writing] programs (tenure-track or non-tenure-track),
which languish at the edges of the so-called legitimate academy?
Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, Writing at the Master's Table: Reflections on Theft,
Criminality, and Otherness in the Legal Writing Profession, 2 DREXEL L. REV. 41,
46 (2009).
17. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
Interpretation 405-6 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015).
18. Id. at Standard 405(d).
19. See Angel, supra note 6, at 4-7.
20. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
Standard 405(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at Interpretation 405-6 (emphasis added).
22. See, e.g., RECOMMENDED INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS ON ACAD. FREEDOM
& TENURE, at Regulation 4(c) (AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS 2014) (discussing
the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary for termination of a tenured faculty
[Vol. 34:137
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defines a bona fide financial exigency as "a severe financial crisis
that fundamentally compromises the academic integrity of the
institution as a whole and that cannot be alleviated by less drastic
,,23
means.
In the case of termination for financial exigency, AAUP
guidelines require significant faculty-member participation in the
decision-making process,24 including involvement of and equitable
processes for affected faculty members. 2' AAUP guidelines require
the institution to demonstrate that it made reasonable efforts to
place the affected faculty member in another suitable position,
26




23. Id. at Regulation 4(c)(1).
24. The guidelines state:
As a first step, there should be an elected faculty governance body, or a
body designated by a collective bargaining agreement, that participates in
the decision that a condition of financial exigency exists or is imminent
and that all feasible alternatives to termination of appointments have been
pursued, including expenditure of one-time money or reserves as bridge
funding, furloughs, pay cuts, deferred-compensation plans, early-
retirement packages, deferral of nonessential capital expenditures, and
cuts to noneducational programs and services, including expenses for
administration.
Id. Moreover, "[b]efore any proposals for program discontinuance on grounds of
financial exigency are made, the faculty or an appropriate faculty body will have
opportunity to render an assessment in writing of the institution's financial
condition." Id. at Regulation 4(c)(2). This includes access to "at least five years of
audited financial statements, current and following-year budgets, and detailed
cash-flow estimates for future years," id. at Regulation 4(c)(2)(i), and "detailed
program, department, and administrative-unit budgets," id. at Regulation
4(c)(2)(ii).
25. Id. at Regulation 4(c)(iii) ("Faculty members in a program being considered
for discontinuance because of financial exigency will promptly be informed of this
activity in writing and provided at least thirty days in which to respond to it.").
Affected faculty members also have a right to a hearing to contest the action:
The issues in this hearing may include the following:
(i) The existence and extent of the condition of financial exigency. The
burden will rest on the administration to prove the existence and extent of
the condition. The findings of a faculty committee in a previous proceeding
involving the same issue may be introduced.
(ii) The validity of the educational judgments and the criteria for
identification for termination; but the recommendations of a faculty body
on these matters will be considered presumptively valid.
(iii) Whether the criteria are being properly applied in the individual
case.
Id. at Regulation 4(c)(3).
26. Id. at Regulation 4(c)(5).
27. Id. at Regulation 4(c)(4) ("If the institution, because of financial exigency,
terminates appointments, it will not at the same time make new appointments,
except in extraordinary circumstances where a serious distortion in the academic
program would otherwise result."). Institutions are further prohibited from
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In the case of programmatic reductions, AAUP guidelines
require an institution to demonstrate that the decision to
eliminate the faculty member was based on educational
considerations.28  "'Educational considerations' do not include
cyclical or temporary variations in enrollment. They must reflect
long-range judgments that the educational mission of the
institution as a whole will be enhanced by the discontinuance."29
Faculty members must be given an opportunity to participate in
the decision, 3 and those affected are protected by equitable
* 31
processes such as notice, full consideration for an alternative
placement, 3 and a "right to a full hearing before a faculty
committee.3 3 While these are guidelines recommended for the
protection of tenured faculty members, they also identify the
rights and processes for tenure security of position; therefore, they
provide a template for the type of rights and processes reasonably
similar to tenure.
terminating tenured faculty members in favor of retaining non-tenured faculty
members. Id. ("[A] faculty member with tenure will not be terminated in favor of
retaining a faculty member without tenure, except in extraordinary circumstances
where a serious distortion of the academic program would otherwise result.").
28. Id. at Regulation 4(d).
29. Id. at Regulation 4(d)(1).
30. Id. ("The decision to discontinue formally a program or department of
instruction will be based essentially upon educational considerations, as
determined primarily by the faculty as a whole or an appropriate committee
thereof.").
31. Id. at Regulation 4(d)(2) ("Faculty members in a program being considered
for discontinuance for educational considerations will promptly be informed of this
activity in writing and provided at least thirty days in which to respond to it.").
32. Id. at Regulation 4(d)(3). The guidelines explain:
Before the administration issues notice to a faculty member of its intention
to terminate an appointment because of formal discontinuance of a
program or department of instruction, the institution will make every
effort to place the faculty member concerned in another suitable position.
If placement in another position would be facilitated by a reasonable
period of training, financial and other support for such training will be
proffered. If no position is available within the institution, with or without
retraining, the faculty member's appointment then may be terminated, but
only with provision for severance salary equitably adjusted to the faculty
member's length of past and potential service, an amount which may well
exceed but not be less than the amount prescribed in Regulation 8.
Id. The guidelines emphasize that "[w]hen an institution proposes to discontinue a
program or department of instruction based essentially on educational
considerations, it should plan to bear the costs of relocating, training, or otherwise
compensating faculty members adversely affected." Id.
33. Id. at Regulation 4(d)(4).
[Vol. 34:137
2016] STARS UPON THARS
III. The Defense of Security of Position Distinctions (or the
Lack Thereof)
As noted, ABA Standard 405(c) requires law schools to
provide contractual faculty members "a form of security of position
reasonably similar to tenure.34 In practice, however, institutions
undergoing financial strain may not provide protections to
contractual faculty members that are actually similar to those
afforded tenured faculty members. Indeed, because the
"reasonably similar" quality of the security afforded to contractual
faculty members is unclear, and in many ways untested, the job-
security hierarchy allows for the discriminatory termination of a
predominantly female cohort of faculty members. 5 By contrast,
little doubt exists in the academy about the substantive and
procedural job security enjoyed by tenured and tenure-track
faculty members, who are predominantly men."
In most cases, the hierarchy cannot reasonably be defended
on the basis of merit. Many, if not most, legal writing faculty
members produce scholarship 7 and perform service. Further,
legal writing faculty members often have academic credentials
equal to their tenure-line peers.39 The teaching of legal writing
34. STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHS.
Standard 405(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2015) (emphasis added).
35. See supra Part I.
36. See supra Part I.
37. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., supra note 3, at 81
(question 81); see also Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a
Discipline? Talking About Legal Writing, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 887-88 n.4 (2002)
(discussing the emergence of legal writing scholarship); Terrill Pollman & Linda H.
Edwards, Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors: New Voices in the Legal
Academy, 11 LEGAL WRITING J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 bibliog. (2005) (listing the
scholarly works of nearly 300 legal writing professionals).
38. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., supra note 3, at 83
(question 83).
39. Susan P. Liemer & Hollee S. Temple, Did Your Legal Writing Professor Go
to Harvard?: The Credentials of Legal Writing Faculty at Hiring Time, 46 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 383, 418-25 (2008) (presenting the study's findings on legal
writing professionals' credentials). Liemer and Temple demonstrated that "many
legal writing professors without tenure-line appointments have credentials equal to
many professors with doctrinal, tenure-line appointments" and questioned why this
discrepancy exists. Id. at 425; see also Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy Maintained:
Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 157
(1997) ("Although law schools seem less concerned about their [Legal Research and
Writing] applicants having graduated from an elite law school, this does not mean
that [applicants] do not need outstanding academic credentials. Usually they do.").
But see Dan Subotnik, Do Law Schools Mistreat Women Faculty? Or, Who's Afraid
of Virginia Woolf?, 44 AKRON L. REV. 867, 879 (2011) ( "[T]he central weakness in
Liemer and Temple's argument is that their study of the legal education of law
teaching candidates is not sufficiently focused at the micro level."). Subotnik
argued: "[W]hat Liemer and Temple need to do to nail down the case of bias is to
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professors is no less intellectual than the teaching of casebook
faculty members.40 In fact, the analytical and writing skills
practiced and reinforced in a legal writing course provide the
foundation for successful communication and performance in both
law school and legal practice. As Kathryn M. Stanchi observed,
show that at a variety of schools the credentials of legal writing professors and
tenure-track faculty are indistinguishable, and that when tenure-track jobs are
available, women are shunted into legal writing." Id. However, there are
compelling illustrations of just this phenomenon in the current conditions for many
female legal writing faculty members across the country-faculty members have
academic credentials and records of service and scholarship that are competitive
with their doctrinal peers, but they nonetheless have substandard security of
position. The fact that these (predominantly female) faculty members teach legal
writing cannot justify this disparate and discriminatory treatment. See Deborah
Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About
Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 263 (1997). In
their 1997 survey, Merritt and Reskin revealed:
Being female significantly increased the likelihood of teaching legal
writing, trial or appellate advocacy, a clinical course, or another skills
offering. Even when men and women possessed the same academic
credentials and work experience, women were significantly more likely to
teach one of these low-status courses. Once again, neither race nor the sex-
race interaction exerted a significant influence on this type of teaching
assignment. Both [W]hite women and women of color were significantly
more likely than [W]hite or minority men with similar credentials to teach
skills courses, an unfortunate result given the disfavored status of these
subjects.
Id. (emphasis added).
40. Indeed, casebook faculty members who argue that they teach "doctrine" (in
contrast to legal writing faculty members who teach "skills") fail to acknowledge
that the teaching of both doctrine and legal reasoning is inherent in legal writing
instruction. See Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School Faculties,
2009 BYU L. REV. 99, 135 (2009) [hereinafter McGinley, Reproducing Gender].
McGinley cautioned that "[t]here is a serious question, however, as to whether the
teaching performed by legal writing faculty is necessarily less intellectual or
whether ... it has been defined as less intellectual because it involves teaching
styles and requirements that are gendered female." Id. She explained that "the
work of the legal writing professor may not necessarily require a deep grasp of a
substantive subject matter, but, when combined with research and publication, it
has the capacity to involve a deeper understanding of procedure and pedagogy than
that required for teaching doctrinal classes." Id. (emphasis added). McGinley
concluded: "[T]he ideal legal writing teacher's work, when compared to the ideal
doctrinal teacher's work, is equally as intellectual. It may also be that the
judgment of the legal writing teaching as less intellectual is based on the gender of
the job-female." Id. Finally, Kristen Konrad Robbins argued:
[W]e need to say it like it is. Not just in law review articles but also to
ourselves, our colleagues, doctrinal faculty, deans, alumni, and students:
we are discriminated against because we are perceived as women who
teach an intellectually inferior and unworthy subject. This is absurd,
outrageous, and unacceptable. We teach a complex and sophisticated art
form that combines the acquisition of knowledge-the law itself-and its
application-persuasive technique.
Kristen Konrad Robbins, Philosophy v. Rhetoric in Legal Education: Understanding
the Schism Between Doctrinal and Legal Writing Faculty, 3 J. ASS'N LEGAL
WRITING DIRECTORS 108, 126 (2006).
[Vol. 34:137
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[t]hose who dismiss teaching writing as easy or unintellectual
never ... seem to even try to explain why (much less provide
any evidence that) teaching torts or criminal law to first year
law students is so difficult that only the most erudite professor
can accomplish it, and why teaching a writing assignment
involving an issue of tort law is somehow a far lesser
challenge. Would a torts professor who taught torts through a
series of torts-related writing assignments be less worthy of
the higher rank than a doctrinal professor who relied on an
end-of-semester examination? Also never questioned is the
common statement of doctrinal teachers that they also do not
teach primarily doctrine, but actually teach "thinking like a
lawyer," which sounds a lot like what legal writing and clinical
professors do. Why is this common pedagogical ground not a
basis for equality?
4
The doctrine versus skills dichotomy "operates as a term of
exclusion that cements one of legal education's most harmful
hierarchies, 42 and is essentially a false one. As Lucille A. Jewel
explained, "[l]egal writing professors teach analytical skills in the
context of substantive law, incorporating civil procedure, modes of
legal reasoning, common law rule synthesis, statutory rule
construction, policy arguments, and professional ethics. ' 43 Legal
41. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique of
the Status Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 467, 480-81 (2004).
42. Lucille A. Jewel, The Doctrine of Legal Writing-Book Review of Linda H.
Edward's Readings in Persuasion: Briefs that Changed the World, 1 SAVANNAH L.
REV. 45, 50 (2014); see also Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: A Doctrinal Course, 1
SAVANNAH L. REV. 1 (2014) (exploring the importance of recognizing the doctrine of
legal writing). Edwards noted that doctrine
defines what counts as disciplinary knowledge,... creates the shared
language necessary to continue the exploration of that knowledge[,] ...
substantively impacts debates within the discipline[,] ... privileges the
positions commonly accepted by the inherited doctrine and requires other
ideas to justify themselves at a higher standard[,] . . . [and] steers scholars
toward exploration of certain subjects and away from others.
Id. at 10-11. Edwards acknowledged the current breadth and potential future of
legal-writing doctrine and cautioned that if the subject matter of legal writing "is
perceived, inaccurately, as having no doctrine, it will never take its rightful place in
the academy and therefore never fulfill its potential to benefit students." Id. at 17-
18 (emphasis added).
43. Jewel, supra note 42, at 50 ("Substance and skill necessarily merge together
in any legal writing class."). Jewel explained that the substance/skills divide was,
in part, a historical consequence of the professionalization process:
At the turn of the century, elite law professors . . . sought to cement their
legal education model as the only acceptable credential for entry into the
profession. This effort meant that the Harvard-style law professor had to
distance himself from members of the practicing bar and practice-oriented
teachers who held the keys to other credentialing models .... As a result
of this tension, elite law professors developed a professional identity




writing courses often cover topics once addressed in venerated
legal methods courses,44 including jurisprudence which has been
"traditionally categorized as an intellectual and theoretical subject
existing on a higher plane than legal writing, [but which] is
actually intimately connected with the process of legal writing.,
4
Finally, the argument that a distinction between casebook courses
and legal writing courses justifies discriminatory treatment of
legal writing faculty members is further undermined by the fact
that many legal writing faculty members teach casebook courses
in addition to teaching legal writing.
IV. Consequences of Institutional Discrimination Against
Female Contractual Faculty Members
It is painfully clear that, notwithstanding a significant
amount of scholarship that acknowledges and addresses this
problem, 47 "legal education has a back of the bus, and it is legal
44. See id. at 61-63 ("We routinely cover the intellectual and analytical
material covered by the old legal method courses.").
45. Id. at 63.
46. ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., supra note 3, at 83
(question 83). In sum, to the extent that legal writing faculty members have
credentials and qualifications that mirror those of the casebook faculty members at
their institutions, their security of position should be equitable. This should occur
particularly where the legal writing professors have satisfied standards for
promotion and retention similar to those of their casebook peers. Ann C. McGinley,
Discrimination in Our Midst: Law Schools' Potential Liability for Employment
Practices, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 56-57 (2005) [hereinafter McGinley,
Discrimination in Our Midst] ("[L]aw schools should work to equalize the positions
of contract and tenure-track faculty ... [and] abolish the faculty policies and/or
practices that create artificial barriers for women who seek tenure-track
positions."). In terms of evaluating faculty on their individual merits rather than
with respect to the courses they teach, McGinley argued that law faculty
should consider carefully and seriously the qualities and qualifications
necessary to a law faculty member on the tenure track and be prepared to
justify their hiring preferences and standards. They should also consider
carefully the qualities and qualifications necessary to a law faculty
member who is hired into a contract position, consciously challenging the
gendered assumptions resting in many of the presumed qualifications.
Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Stanchi, supra note 41, at 468 ("This institutionalized status
system is based on elitism and gender discrimination. .... Even more troubling is
the way that the hierarchy is gender segregated, with women at the bottom and
men at the top. Anytime a substantial cluster of women hold low-pay, low-status
jobs, feminist and humanist alarms should ring."); see also Peter Brandon Bayer, A
Plea for Rationality and Decency: The Disparate Treatment of Legal Writing
Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and Professional Ethics, 39 DUQ.
L. REV. 329, 353 (2001) ("Among all full-time members of law school faculties, only
legal writing teachers are subjected to systemic and persistent inequality ranging
from remarkably disadvantageous terms of employment to disdain and segregation
within their own law school societies. With the endorsement, if not outright
encouragement, of the American Bar Association ... , most law schools impose on
[Vol. 34:137
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writing."48  The discriminatory treatment of legal writing faculty
members not only impacts female members of the academy, but
also undermines student success in several important ways. First,
if the security of position of contractual faculty members is not
adequately protected, students may have access to fewer skills
professors during a time when they need more one-on-one
guidance than ever.49 It has been widely reported that, with
declining enrollments, many schools have lowered the academic
credentials of incoming students.0 Moreover, recent criticism of
legal education has focused on the need for more skills training. 1
The ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education noted in its
most recent recommendations that
legal writing professors a wide assortment of conditions distinctly and deliberately
less desirable than those enjoyed by other full-time law teachers."); McGinley,
Discrimination in Our Midst, supra note 46, at 11 ("While it is unclear whether the
legal writing jobs are lower paid and lower status because they are predominantly
occupied by women or whether women are hired into these jobs because the jobs
themselves are of lower status, or whether both of these propositions are true,
years after the application of the Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, law
schools have created a segregated, unequal society in which women are clustered in
the lower status, lower paying jobs, and men occupy the more prestigious, more
highly paid positions."); McGinley, Reproducing Gender, supra note 40, at 128
("Faculty members who are not hired onto the tenure track are usually clinical,
library, legal writing, or academic support faculty. These jobs suffer from lower
status, are occupied predominately by women, pay less, and are gendered female.");
Robbins, supra note 40, at 110 ("Given the increasing importance of legal research
and writing to law students, how do we explain this ongoing disparity? At a
minimum, the disparity reflects gender discrimination, pure and simple."); Stanchi
& Levine, supra note 14, at 4 ("Unlike any law firm or corporation, the legal
academy has an explicit and de jure two-track system for its lawyers: a high-
status, high-pay professorial track made up overwhelmingly of men, and a low-
status, low-pay 'instructor' track made up overwhelmingly of women.").
48. John A. Lynch, Jr., Teaching Legal Writing After a Thirty-Year Respite: No
Country for Old Men?, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) ("The inference of gender
animosity in the treatment of legal writing teachers is even stronger in light of
unequal treatment of women faculty in legal education generally and, remarkably,
superior treatment of men within the legal writing community.").
49. See, e.g., ASS'N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS. & LEGAL WRITING INST., QUALITY
LEGAL WRITING INSTRUCTION AND ABA ACCREDITATION STANDARD 405: REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2001) ("A legal writing program is effective only if
directors and teachers are provided with adequate job security. A school cannot
provide quality or success in any instructional activity unless it guarantees
continuity, professionalism, and resources for those who administer and teach.").
50. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Why Now Is a Good Time To Apply to Law School,
FORBES (Nov. 24, 2013, 1:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryancalo/2013/11/24/
why-now-is-a-good-time-to-apply-to-law-school/ ("[S]chools are competing feverishly
for good students. An applicant who, a few years ago, would have been waitlisted
at a top twenty school, may now find herself with a scholarship.").
51. See TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/




[t]he calls for more attention to skills training, experiential
learning, and the development of practice-related
competencies have been heard and many law schools have
expanded practice-preparation opportunities for students.
Yet, there is need to do much more. The balance between
doctrinal instruction and focused preparation for the delivery
of legal services needs to shift still further toward developing
the competencies and professionalism required of people who
will deliver services to clients. 2
Given the academy's acknowledged emphasis on skills instruction,
and the fact that incoming students may warrant more focused
instruction on the foundational skills introduced in a legal writing
course, it would be difficult to justify dilution of legal writing
faculties based on educational considerations as required by the
AAUP Standards. 3
The second potential consequence of failing to protect female
405(c) faculty members is that students have fewer female faculty-
member role models. Citing the ABA Commission on Women in
the Profession, one commentator noted that "[g]ender bias that
affects women students or faculty, at best, starts young male and
female lawyers off on the wrong foot and at worst, fails to provide
them with the tools they will need to overcome the barriers they
will likely encounter during their careers.5 4  Another author
observed that, when law courses become gendered, and female
faculty members dominate particular courses, students suffer: "If
the female faculty is primarily teaching less prestigious courses,
the role model they present to female students may be a
discouraging one. 55 Such situations influence student perception
and "may narrow female student's and lawyer's aspirations for
future careers, and possibly confirm their suspicion that women do
not succeed in certain types of practices." 6
The consequences of providing legal writing faculty members
with sub-standard employment conditions make it even less
desirable for female faculty members of color, which further
dilutes the pool of diverse female role models for students. As
52. Id.
53. See supra Part II.
54. Lynch, supra note 48, at 16 (citing COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION,
AM. BAR ASS'N, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: THE EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN IN LEGAL
EDUCATION 3-4 (1996)); see also id. ("[L]aw schools have a responsibility to
encourage their students to respect the law and to behave in a manner that
encourages others to do so.").
55. Kornhauser, supra note 6, at 326.
56. Id. ("[W]omen teaching less prestigious areas of the law may help
perpetuate the over-representation of women practicing in those areas.").




Legal writing, at its essence, is about teaching students to
"think like lawyers." This process necessarily involves
teaching students how to approach a problem from various
perspectives, but within the limited structure of distinguishing
legal facts and issues from non-legal ones through a formal
and logical reasoning process devoid of emotion and
partiality.8
For female faculty members of color, however, "[t]he structure and
racial composition of [Legal Research and Writing (LRW)]
programs makes it more likely that LRW faculty will not
problematize the process by which lawyers and jurists analyze and
reason." 9 Further,
[i]f LRW programs continue to be structured in a manner that
makes them the less desirable choice in the academy for
people of color, students will lose access to these diverse
perspectives-these different ways of knowing and
experiencing the world. Without knowledge of these
experiences, students will absorb the process by which legal
institutions protect [W]hite privilege and power without
consciousness of this process as such. Accordingly, they will
face the danger of forming unexamined assumptions about
people of color, rooted in the seemingly objective process of
legal reasoning and analysis, which influence their
construction and communication of legal arguments as
lawyers and jurists.6
0
A final consequence of allowing discriminatory treatment of
female 405(c) faculty members is that our students-students who
will become lawyers-may become desensitized to discriminatory
treatment of female members of the profession. 61  As Ann C.
McGinley explained, "[b]y our willingness to ignore the structural
and economic forces that cause law schools to discriminate against
women, we implicitly offer to our graduates and the legal
profession the message that sex discrimination in employment is
permissible."62 It is particularly troubling and painful that the
academy would allow such desensitization to occur in law school,
as students develop their professional identitie.
63
member of a majority group often lacks the perspective of those outside of their
shared experiences as majority group members.").
58. Id. at 54.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 55.
61. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 16 ("The doctrinal faculty's treatment of the
legal writing faculty provides a bad example for law students to do likewise.").
62. McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst, supra note 46, at 59.
63. Id. at 56 (recommending the equalization of the conditions of employment
afforded to tenure and contact faculty members at law schools). McGinley noted:
2016]
Law and Inequality
V. Recommendation: A Watchful Eye
The solution should have been straightforward: amend the
ABA Accreditation Standards so that all law faculty members
have the same security of position. Substandard conditions of
employment are not appropriate when they are "applied only to
one cohort of the law professoriate. Application of such a standard
is suspicious when the group to which it is applied is
overwhelmingly female. 64  This is even more questionable given
ABA Standard 211, which prohibits law schools from
discrimination based on sex.65 Unfortunately, the most recent
round of modifications to the ABA Accreditation Standards has
demonstrated that this relatively uncomplicated solution will not
occur.
McGinley has observed that law schools may be liable for the
discrimination sanctioned by the standards:
While there may be complicated reasons for women's
concentration at the bottom of the law school faculty
hierarchy, the fact is that law school administrators and
faculty have looked the other way, ignoring a situation that
many find uncomfortable and inequitable. The concentration
of women in the lower levels of law faculty hierarchies makes
law schools vulnerable ethically and practically.66
Notwithstanding, McGinley asserted that "the ghettoization of
women lawyers in law schools should not be an intractable
problem.6 7  Because "legal education has traditionally had the
responsibility of leading the way among lawyers, espousing ethical
principles that lawyers should follow, 68 legal educators and
administrators should carefully evaluate attempts to interfere
with the security of position afforded to contractual faculty
members who are predominantly female. This is particularly true
because contractual female law professors may not be in a position
Reform will not only avoid litigation; it will also permit law schools to
serve as an example to corporations, law firms[,] and other entities.
Furthermore, it will allow female students, who represent almost half of
law school graduates, to expect law firms and corporations where they
work to permit them to fulfill their full potential as lawyers and as
citizens.
Id.
64. See Lynch, supra note 48, at 15.
65. See, e.g., id. at 16 ("Although it is difficult to reconcile with Standard 405(d),
which essentially enables law schools to treat legal writing teachers unequally,
ABA Standard 211 requires law schools to embrace equal opportunity, including
nondiscrimination based on sex.").
66. McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst, supra note 46, at 3.
67. Id. at 56 ("[L]aw schools should work to equalize the positions of contract
and tenure-track faculty.").
68. Id. at 59.
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to challenge an institution that ignores tenure-like processes for
dismissal. Earning a presumptively renewable contract provides
faculty members with rights, but rights that have not been well
defined or tested.69 This makes the Standards inadequate in
practice if they are not properly monitored and enforced. To the
extent, therefore, that discriminatory treatment facilitated by the
Standards exists, institutional attempts to undermine or ignore
the modest protections afforded by the Standards should be closely
scrutinized and prohibited. Specifically, attempts by law schools
to target legal writing faculty members for termination-
especially in an environment where incoming law students need
one-on-one instruction -should be closely evaluated to determine
whether such attempts comport with a form of tenure-like
security.
Conclusion
The Standards and statistics demonstrate that "the
predominantly female legal writing cohort endures 'a version of
gender discrimination that no law firm or corporation would dare
institutionalize or rationalize, let alone put into print.'
72
Confronting this form of discrimination is difficult and
frightening.73 However, if institutions are allowed to disregard or
minimize the job security protections afforded to predominately
female contractual faculty members, the marginalization of and
discrimination against women will increase to the detriment of the
academy, its students, and the profession.
69. See supra Part I.
70. Kristen Konrad Tiscione, A Writing Revolution: Using Legal Writing's
"Hobble" To Solve Legal Education's Problem, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 143, 152 (2014)
(outlining the declining research and writing skills of incoming law students).
Tiscione noted that "[t]eaching law graduates to be competent, professional writers
may become more difficult because matriculating law students have less writing
experience and, perhaps, weaker research, reading comprehension, critical-
thinking, and writing skills than in the past." Id.
71. See McGinley, Discrimination in Our Midst, supra note 46, at 4.
72. Lynch, supra note 48, at 13 (citing Stanchi & Levine, supra note 14, at 4).
73. Robbins, supra note 40, at 128 ("Political struggles such as these are
painful, frightening, and isolating. That alone has prevented most of us from
speaking out against what we know to be unfair.").
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